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Associatively-Mediated Stopping: Training Stimulus-Specific
Inhibitory Control
William A. Bowditch Frederick Verbruggen & I.P.L. McLaren
School of Psychology, University of Exeter
Response inhibition is often considered to be a deliberate act of cognitive control. However,
our and other research suggests that by repeatedly pairing stimuli with an inhibitory response,
inhibition can become automatized. Currently, relatively little research has focused on the nature
of the associative structure that underpins stimulus-specific inhibitory training. This paper in-
vestigated what associations can be learnt in stop-signal training tasks, distinguishing between
indirect priming of the stop signal and direct activation of a stop response. We employed a
novel paradigm, where colored cues are stochastically paired with a number of stop-signals,
and demonstrated that cues consistently paired with stopping reduced commission errors and
slowed reaction times. Furthermore, we showed that manipulating the pairings between stimuli
and stop signals, in a manner that favored the formation of stimulus-stop associations, produced
enhanced stop learning effects on reaction time, but not probability of responding. Our results
suggest that perceptual processes supporting signal detection (priming) as well as inhibitory
processes are involved in inhibitory control training, and that inhibition training may benefit
from reducing the contingency between stimuli and stop-signals.
Keywords: Inhibitory control; Stop-signal training; Response inhibition; Associative learning;
Stimulus specific training.
The ability to exert executive control over our behavior is
key; without this fundamental ability we would haphazardly
engage in whatever behaviors are prompted by our current
environment (Brazzelli & Spinnler, 1998; Lhermitte, 1983;
O’Reilly, 2006). In this paper we take control to be a mul-
tifaceted concept (Miyake et al., 2000), of which inhibition
is a core component that facilitates goal-directed behavior
through the suppression of otherwise prepotent responses
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c)1.
Theories of executive control typically ascribe inhibitory
control to a deliberate top-down process that selectively mod-
ulates bottom-up environment-driven processes (Miller & Co-
hen, 2001; O’Reilly, 2006; Ridderinkhof, van den Wilden-
berg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Verbruggen & Logan,
2008c). However, a growing body of research suggests that
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response inhibition, in certain situations, can itself operate au-
tomatically in a bottom-up stimulus-driven fashion akin to the
automaticity observed in learnt response execution (Logan
1988; Schneider and Shiffrin 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider
1977; for a review see: Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens,
and McLaren 2014). Verbruggen and Logan (2008a, Exper-
iment 5) demonstrated that, by pairing stimuli with an in-
hibitory response, inhibitory processes could become some-
what automatized. Participants were trained on a stop-signal
task, where the stimulus category (i.e. living or non-living)
determined the correct response (i.e. left or right). Subsets
of stimuli were repeatedly paired with the requirement to re-
spond or withhold the response throughout training, allowing
for the formation of stimulus-specific associations. Upon test,
when the stimulus mappings were reversed, participants were
slower to respond to stimuli previously paired with stopping
in comparison to stimuli associated with responding. In a
similar paradigm, Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, Logan, and Pol-
drack (2011) demonstrated that stimulus-specific slowing on
1Whilst the concept of inhibition is often invoked in explaining
behaviour (or the lack of it), its direct involvement in many tasks is
debatable (MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003). There
is, however, little doubt that inhibitory control is directly involved
in the cancellation of an already initiated motor response, and thus
our research employs tasks that require the active suppression of a
prepotent motor response; such as the go/no-go (Donders, 1969) and
stop-signal tasks (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a).
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no-signal trials was accompanied by increased activation of
the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), a region typically im-
plicated in response inhibition (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack,
2004, 2014; Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009). This
last result suggests that the stimuli in question were associ-
ated with some "stop center". In this paper we investigate the
mechanisms by which stimulus-specific stop effects are learnt
within the stop-signal paradigm, differentiating between per-
ceptual and response processes, with a view to enhance in-
hibitory control training paradigms.
Verbruggen, McLaren, and Chambers (2014) have pro-
posed a theoretical framework that ascribes action control
to three fundamental cognitive processes: signal detection,
action selection and action execution. The present paper ex-
plores the role played by signal detection and its interaction
with associative learning in stop-signal paradigms. Signal-
detection is undoubtedly essential for successful response
inhibition; computational models suggest that a significant
portion of stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) reflects non-
inhibitory detection processes (Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, &
Schall, 2007; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & Wagenmak-
ers, 2014) and increasing the difficulty of signal detection
by introducing irrelevant perceptual distractors impairs SSRT
(particularly when the stop signal could occur in the periph-
ery; Verbruggen, Stevens, and Chambers 2014). Furthermore,
there is some evidence that stimulus detection may indeed be
enhanced, in an implicit, associative manner, through repeated
pairing; both detection and recognition are augmented in vi-
sual search when distractors (which act as cues) consistently
co-occur with the same target stimulus, even when location
varies randomly (Chun & Jiang, 1999). Our point of departure
in this paper is to note that by definition, the signal to stop
and the act of stopping are entirely confounded within the
stop-signal paradigm. Thus, when a cue that consistently pre-
cedes a signal trial is presented, there are at least two events
that can be predicted: firstly, the imminent presentation of
the stop signal and secondly, the impending requirement to
withhold ones response. Crucially, these consequences have
rather different cognitive requirements. The former does not
require the involvement of motor inhibition and operates at a
perceptual signal-detection level, whilst the latter does require
inhibition or preparation for its initiation.
We can distinguish between at least two possible types
of associatively-mediated pathway to action inhibition (see
Figure 1): One makes use of a direct associative link between
the cue associated with stopping and some representation of
stopping itself, variously termed a "stop center" or "stop goal"
(we shall use the former designation). The other, indirect as-
sociative pathway, operates by means of a link between the
cue to the representation of the stop signal used in the experi-
ment, and exploits the ability of that (active) representation to
inhibit ongoing actions; for simplicity, we have assumed that
the latter is achieved via a link from the signal to the same
representation of stopping utilised by the direct pathway, but
we acknowledge that this does not have to be the case. Note
that these direct and indirect associative pathways do not nec-
essarily map onto the direct and indirect cortical-subcortical
pathways (Nambu, Tokuno, & Takada, 2002).
Both associative pathways are capable of producing
associatively-mediated stopping effects, by which we mean
producing slowing of RTs when that cue is presented on a
no-signal trial and/or reduced errors of commission (lower
p(respond|signal)) on stop trials, and both will typically be
involved in stimulus-specific stop effects. The mechanism is
straightforward for the direct pathway: It enables the cue to
activate the representation that leads to stopping, which slows
a go response on a go trial and helps avoid an erroneous ac-
tion on a stop trial. The case for the indirect pathway can
be equally straightforward if we simply assume that the cue
activates the signal representation sufficiently to allow it to in
turn then activate the stop centre. There is, however, another
possibility inherent in this arrangement of links and repre-
sentations, which is that the activation passed to the signal
representation is not sufficient to result in any appreciable
activation that can then be passed on to the stop centre. In-
stead, this input primes signal detection, allowing easier and
more rapid detection of the stop signal when it occurs, as it
already has some sub-threshold input applied to it. Whilst
detection of the stop signal is essential to successfully stop,
and thus its enhancement may be advantageous on signal tri-
als, this scenario would have little behavioral consequence
on trials where the stop signal does not occur. As reaction
time measures are gathered on no-signal trials, we would not
expect to observe much slowing if enhanced signal detection
is what drives an associatively-mediated stop effect. This ar-
rangement naturally leads to the prediction that the indirect
pathway can lead to effects on p(respond|signal) in the ab-
sence of any effect on RT (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014).
By contrast, the direct pathway is constrained to affect both
p(respond|signal) and RT.
The indirect associative pathway is reliant on stable contin-
gencies between cues and stop signals. Therefore, manipulat-
ing the contingencies between cues and stop signals can bias
the relative strength of the direct and indirect associative path-
ways. This can be straightforwardly implemented by system-
atically varying the number of stop signals such that cues are
either (A) presented with a single stop signal, or (B) presented
with multiple stop signals that are equally distributed across
all cues (see Table 1). Table 2 gives further insight into this
manipulation. It gives the contingency (defined as (P(event |
target cue)-P(event | no target cue)) × 100) relating the cue to
either the signal(s) used or stopping. Inspection of the table
reveals that in the single-signal case the contingencies for the
signal and for stopping are obviously the same. The implica-
tion is that both associations will, other things being equal,
be learned to a similar extent. We can use performance in
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Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of possible pathways to stopping.The direct pathway (bold dashed line) depicts associ-
ations from the cue to the stop centre that are not mediated via the stop signal representation. The indirect pathway (dashed
line) depicts associations to the stop signal representation, which can then trigger activation in the stop centre via the link (solid
arrow) that already exists.
this condition as a baseline for predicting what will happen in
our other condition. In the multiple-signal case the pattern of
contingencies changes - now the contingencies for stopping
are substantially higher than those for the signal, favoring
the formation of direct cue to stop associations, particularly
as the contingent relationship to the signal is now so weak.
Thus, we can argue that the shift to multiple signals should
bring about a quite substantial shift in the relative strengths
of the pathways involved in any associatively-mediated stop-
ping, and this in turn should lead to stronger effects on RT in
such a multiple-signal condition.
Our analysis thus far can only be part of the story, as
close inspection of the table reveals that the contingencies
for single- and multiple-signal conditions are the same for
stopping, but different for the signal. Thus, one reading of
the contingency table is that the strength of the associative
link to the stop centre should be equal in both groups in our
experiments, but there should be more priming of the stop sig-
nal in the single group. There are two possible mechanisms,
however, which suggest that reducing the stimulus-signal con-
tingency will result in stronger stimulus-stop learning. One
relies quite straightforwardly on the fact that ultimately both
pathways attempt to activate the stop center. If an error cor-
recting algorithm is in force for associative learning, as we
believe is the case (McLaren et al., 2014; Verbruggen, Best,
et al., 2014), then the more effective one pathway is the less
effective the other pathway will be - they will compete for the
ability to activate the stop center. One way of viewing this is
as an example of the overshadowing phenomenon often found
in associative learning (Mackintosh 1976; and see McLaren
et al. 2014). As has recently been noted, however, there is
another mechanism that can bring about overshadowing that
may be particularly applicable to our single vs. multiple ma-
nipulation (Civile, Chamizo, Mackintosh, & McLaren, 2014).
This appeals to generalization decrement (Pearce, 1987) and
simply points out that if two stimuli (in this case the serial
compound of the cue and the stop signal) both predict an
outcome (stopping), then when one (say the cue) is presented,
the activation of that outcome representation suffers from gen-
eralization decrement (i.e. a reduction in that activation) due
to the other stimulus not being presented. It is easy to see how
this might apply to the single-signal case. But the multiple-
signal case explicitly trains reliance on the cue rather than
the stop signal. Here the network (see McLaren, Forrest, and
McLaren 2012 for an example of such a network) will form
multiple representations that capture each cue and signal con-
figuration’s link to stopping. When the cue is presented on its
own, it will only partially activate all these representations,
but the summed effect on stopping will be strong. Therefore,
there will be less generalization decrement than in the case
where a single cue + signal representation is involved. As
a consequence, both mechanisms predict that less overshad-
owing will be observed, and consequently the associatively-
mediated effect on stopping will be greater, in the multiple-
signal case than in the single-signal case. Our experiments
test this prediction.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects. Forty-two students from the University of Ex-
eter participated in return for £5 cash or 1 course credit. The
majority of which were right handed (97%), females (71%),
with an average age of 22 years and 7 months.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The experiment was run on an
iMac computer (20” display; Apple, California) using Mat-
lab 2012b in conjunction with the Psychophysics Toolbox
3 (Brainard, 1997). The stimuli consisted of three circles
(19mm diameter) arranged in a horizontal line and presented
centrally on a 50% grey background, and separated by 22mm
edge-to-edge. At fixation, the middle circle appeared as a
white outline, which on each trial filled with one of four colors
(see Table 1 and Figure 2). Subsequently, one of the periph-
eral circles (left or right) filled with white and participants
responded with a spatially congruent key (‘X’ or ‘.>’, with
their left or right index finger). However, on signal trials the
4 BOWDITCH, VERBRUGGEN & MCLAREN
Stop-signal Colour
Single Multiple
Cue Colour Signal Trials No-signal Trials E F...G...H E F G H
A 75% Stop 24 8 24 0 6 6 6 6
B 25% Stop 8 24 8 0 2 2 2 2
C 50% Stop 16 16 16 0 4 4 4 4
D 50% Stop 16 16 16 0 4 4 4 4
Table 1
Depicts the design and cue/stop signal pairings employed in Experiments 1 and 2. ABCD represent central cue colors; either
blue (RGB: 000 000 255), yellow (255 255 000), violet (128 000 128) or brown (128 051 000). EFGH represent stop signal
colors; these were orange (255 128 000), pink (255 170 204), red-brown (168 046 037), or turquoise (000 172 165).
peripheral circle filled with one of four colors after a variable
delay, prompting participants to withhold their response. In-
correct responses (or failures to respond) were signaled with a
400Hz 150-millisecond tone delivered through loudspeakers.
Procedure
Each trial began with the presentation of a cue, when the
central circle filled with one of four colors (Table 1) for
250ms. Following the colored cue, which remained on screen
for the duration of the trial, one of the peripheral circles filled
white, instructing the participant to execute a left or right
response. On no-signal trials, the go stimulus remained on
screen for 1000ms during which period the participant could
respond. However, on some trials, following a variable stop-
signal delay (SSD), the circle temporarily changed to one of
four colors (stop signal) for 250ms, instructing the participant
to withhold their response. The next trial commenced after
a variable inter trial interval (between 250-500ms; average
375ms), during which the fixation screen was displayed.
The onset of the stop signal was varied systematically
based on each participants’ performance: initially the SSD
was set at 250ms from stimulus onset, but after two consecu-
tive successful stop trials it was increased by 50ms and each
failure to stop resulted in a 50ms decrease. The SSD could
therefore vary between 50–950ms. The tracking procedure ap-
plied only to control trials (50% stop), but experimental trials
Contingency(signal)x100 Contingency(stop)x100
Single Multiple Single Multiple
75% Stop 33.3 8.33 33.3 33.3
50% Stop 0 0 0 0
25% Stop -33.3 -8.33 -33.3 -33.3
Table 2
Contingencies between cues and stop-signals or stopping. De-
fined as P(event | target cue)-P(event | not target cue) × 100
and therefore can vary between +100 and -100. A zero con-
tingency means there is no predictive relationship.
were yoked to the same SSD. The 2-up/one-down procedure
typically results in a 30% probability of successfully respond-
ing to a stop trial (p(respond|signal)) and compensates for
both within and between-participant differences (Verbruggen
& Logan, 2009). We used this tracking procedure to ensure
that stopping was successful on most signal trials, as previous
research suggests that the outcome can influence learning in
stop-signal tasks (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b, 2008a).
Each cue color was stochastically predictive of whether
the trial would involve the execution or inhibition of a re-
sponse: one cue color was mostly paired with stopping (75%
stop), one responding (25% stop), and two with both (50%
stop) (see Table 1). Thus, the overall number of signal and
no-signal trials was equal. Consistent with our previous work
(Yeates, Jones, Wills, McLaren, & McLaren, 2012; Yeates,
Jones, Wills, Aitken, & McLaren, 2013), the predictive value
of the cue was not explicitly revealed to participants and they
were simply told: “The central colored circle acts as a warning
that the trial is about to begin”.
The color cues were either paired with a single stop signal
or distributed evenly across multiple stop signals (a between
groups manipulation). In both cases participants were given
the same instructions: to “stop if the filled circle changes from
white to any color”. However, the single stop-signal group
only saw one color, randomly selected from a pool of four,
as a stop signal. In the multiple-signal group, each cue was
paired with four different colored stop signals equally often
(see Table 1).
Participants completed 10 training blocks of 128 trials, fol-
lowed by two test blocks of the same length, where all cues
were non-predictive (all contingencies 50:50). If subjects had
acquired stimulus-stop associations during training, we would
expect this to influence performance at test. Between each
block participants were given a 30 second break (minimum)
and given feedback if performance substantially differed from
the previous block. Specifically, if participants’ reaction times
slowed by 5% and reaction times were >300ms they were in-
structed to respond more rapidly. Similarly, if errors increased
by 5% and were in excess of 5%, they were instructed to re-
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Figure 2. Depicts an example stop trial. All durations are in milliseconds. The central colored circle acts as the cue, the white
circle to the left or right (right in this case) as the go stimulus, and if it changes color (orange in this case) this is the stop signal.
A go trial progresses with the same time course but in the absence of the stop signal.
spond more accurately. Following the stop-signal task, par-
ticipants were shown each central cue and asked to rate how
much they would expect to respond or withhold responding
on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Definitely).
Analysis
All data was analysed using R (R Development Core
Team, 2014), raw data and analysis scripts are available online
(http://hdl.handle.net/10871/18105).
Two participants were excluded from the initial analysis:
one for not stopping throughout the experiment and one due
to technical difficulties that prevented them from completing
the experiment.
Boxplot analysis identified five outliers: three had unusu-
ally low no-signal choice accuracy (< 75%) and two had un-
usually high p(respond | signal) (> 0.39), leaving seventeen
participants in the single-signal group and eighteen partici-
pants in the multiple-signal group.
Results and discussion
Results are summarized in Table 3. We analyzed perfor-
mance with a mixed ANOVA with trial type (75%, 50%, or
25% Stop) and block as within subject factors, and Group
(multi vs. single) as a between subjects factor. Then we con-
sidered any of the interactions with Group that required fur-
ther analysis.
Evidence of learning in measures of reaction time was
observed across both training and test (see Figure 3, top
panel). During training a main effect of trial type was ob-
served (p<.01, nˆ2G = .001); planned comparisons revealed
that participants were slower to respond to trials cued by a
75% stop cue (M = 624, SD = 155) in comparison to those
cued by a 50% (M = 617, SD = 154) (p<.01, nˆ2G = .001)
or 25% (M = 613, SD = 153) (p<.01, nˆ2G = .001) stop cue.
50% stop cues and 25% stop cues did not significantly differ
(p=.20, nˆ2G = .000).
At test the effect of trial type was marginally significant
(p<.06, nˆ2G = .001); follow up comparisons revealed that
75% stop cues (M = 614, SD = 165) prompted significantly
slower responses than 25% stop cues (M = 602, 163) (p<.04,
nˆ2G = .001), all other comparisons failed to reach significance
(all p>.12, nˆ2G ≤ .001). The analysis revealed a three-way in-
teraction between trial type, block, and group (multiple/single
stop signals) during test (p<.04, nˆ2G = .001), which was lim-
ited to the 75%/25% stop comparison (p<.03, nˆ2G = .001).
Whilst for the single-signal group, participants were initially
slower to respond to 75% stop cued trials in comparison to
25% stop cued trials, the effect was markedly reduced by the
second test block. Conversely, the multiple-signal group were
slower to respond to 75% stop cued trials in comparison to
25% stop cued trials across both blocks, with the effect being
somewhat larger in the second block of test. We investigated
this interaction further by running separate contrasts for the
75% vs 25% comparison for each group in each test block.
This revealed that there was a marginally significant effect
for the first block of test in the single-signal group (p<.06,
nˆ2G = .007; but none in the second block of test, where numer-
ically the effect reversed. The multiple-signal group exhibited
the converse pattern, with no significant effect of 75% stop
vs. 25% stop in the first block of test (the numerical effect
was in the expected direction), but a marginally significant
effect in the second (p<.08, nˆ2G = .004). This pattern could
suggest that there are roughly equivalent weak effects in both
groups, and it was just chance that led to it manifesting in the
first block for the single-signal group and the second block
for the multiple-signal group. Alternatively, this result could
suggest that the distributed signal training resulted in more ro-
bust learning, in the sense that the single-signal effects either
diminished rapidly or were simply weaker and hence more
6 BOWDITCH, VERBRUGGEN & MCLAREN
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l l
l
Single−signal Multiple−signal
550
600
650
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Block
R
ea
ct
io
n 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
P(
Re
sp
on
d|S
ign
al)
Cue Type l75% Stop 50% Stop 25% Stop
Figure 3. Mean reaction times of no-signal trial (top) and p(respond|signal) (bottom) for the single-signal (left) and multiple-
signal groups (right) from Experiment 1. Error bars are normalised 95% confidence intervals (see Morey, 2008).
variable. We shall return to this point shortly.
In measures of p(respond|signal) we observed main effects
of trial type in both training (p<.01, nˆ2G = .009) and test
(p<.02, nˆ2G = .035) (see Figure 3 bottom panel) and there
were no significant interactions with the group factor. Planned
comparisons revealed that, during training, participants were
less likely to make a commission error to trials cued by a 75%
stop cue (M = 0.28, SD = 0.11) in comparison to a 25% stop
cue (M = 0.31, SD = 0.17) (p<.01, nˆ2G = .010). 75% stop
cues also significantly differed from controls (50% stop, M =
0.30, SD = 0.05) (p<.03, nˆ2G = .007). Similarly, during test,
participants were less likely to make a commission error to
trials preceded by a 75% stop cue (M = 0.28, SD = 0.14) in
comparison to 25% stop cues (M = 0.33, SD = 0.13) (p<.02,
nˆ2G = .033). However, during test only the 25% stop cues
differed from 50% controls (M = 0.30, SD =0.04) (p<.01,
nˆ2G = .040; 75% vs. 50% p = .52, nˆ
2
G = .003).
Overall, these results confirm that the contingencies were
learned, as the 75% vs 25% difference is reliable, and in-
volves slower responding on no-signal trials and fewer errors
of commission on signal trials to the 75% stop cue relative
to the 25% stop cue. The fact that there was no interaction in
p(respond|signal) during test with the group factor was also
expected and suggests that both single-signal and multiple-
signal groups were equally able to benefit from the presence
of a 75% stop cue in aiding them to withhold their response
on a stop-signal trial. As we have indicated, the interaction
with the group factor for RTs on no-signal trials during test
could indicate that the effect on RTs was more robust in the
multiple-signal group, but the involvement of block compli-
cates its interpretation. Given the importance of this issue for
our theoretical understanding of the basis of the associatively-
mediated stopping effect we decided to replicate and extend
Experiment 1 to clarify this result.
Experiment 2
The interaction observed in Experiment 1 is consistent
with the idea that distributing multiple stop signals equally
across cues influences the associatively mediated stopping
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Table 3
Summary of Experiment 1
DFn DFd SSn SSd F p p<.05 nˆ2G
Training
Go Reaction Time
cue type 2 66 22570.71 97132.60 7.67 .001 * .001
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 21446.61 59628.24 11.87 .002 * .001
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 10456.92 48818.39 7.07 .012 * .001
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 1952.54 37252.27 1.73 .198 .000
p(respond)
cue type 2 66 0.13 0.86 5.10 .014 * .009
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 0.13 0.61 7.21 .011 * .010
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 0.03 0.22 5.15 .030 * .007
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 0.03 0.46 2.29 .139 .003
Test
Go Reaction Time
cue type 2 66 4979.56 54805.72 3.00 .058 .001
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 4834.75 34151.77 4.67 .038 * .001
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 592.67 20961.43 0.93 .341 .000
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 2041.92 27095.37 2.49 .124 .001
cue type:block:multiple/single 2 66 4333.73 42132.54 3.39 .043 * .001
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 4280.02 26233.07 5.38 .027 * .001
Single Signal block 11 1 16 5117.246 19171.19 4.27 .055 ^ .007
Single Signal block 12 1 16 200.51 11685.08 0.27 .607 .000
Multiple Signal Block 11 1 17 338.32 10236.30 0.56 .464 .000
Multiple Signal Block 12 1 17 3964.97 19292.27 3.49 .079 ^ .004
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 1525.48 23135.00 2.18 .150 .000
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 695.08 13830.75 1.66 .207 .000
p(respond)
cue type 2 66 0.09 0.69 4.29 .022 * .035
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 0.08 0.48 5.57 .024 * .033
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 0.00 0.32 0.42 .521 .003
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 0.05 0.24 6.82 .013 * .040
effect, presumably as the distribution of signals reduces the
formation of cue-signal associations and therefore increases
the relative strength of cue-stop associations. Experiment 2
sought to replicate this effect, using the same procedures as
Experiment 1 but this time run in a group testing facility al-
lowing us to test more participants.
Method
Subjects. Sixty-six students from the University of Ex-
eter participated in return for 1 course credit or £5. The ma-
jority of which were right handed (89.6%) females (62.7%),
with an average age of 20 years.
Apparatus & Stimuli. The stimuli were identical to
those used in Experiment 1. However, Experiment 2 was run
on PCs, with 19” monitors, in a multiple testing environment.
Consequentially, error tones were presented through closed
headphones, rather than loud speakers.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2. Partic-
ipants were assigned to each stop-signal group serially, unless
they were replacing an identified outlier.
Analysis
Two participants were excluded for using the incorrect re-
sponse keys. A further four participants were removed for
having unusually low no-signal choice accuracy (<75%) and
two for having unusually high p(respond|signal) (>41%) as
identified by box-and-whisker analysis. This left 60 partici-
pants in total, with 30 in each stop-signal group.
Results and discussion
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4
and Figure 4. Replicating Experiment 1, we observed a main
effect of cue type in reaction times during training (p<.04,
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Figure 4. Mean reaction times of no-signal trials (top) and p(respond|signal) (bottom) for the single-signal (left) and multiple-
signal groups (right) from Experiment 2. Error bars are normalised 95% confidence intervals (see Morey, 2008).
nˆ2G = .000). Planned comparisons confirmed that 75% stop
cues (M = 563, SD = 111) were significantly different to both
25% (M = 558, SD = 109) (p<.05, nˆ2G = .000) and 50% (M
= 559, SD = 113) (p<.02, nˆ2G = .000) stop cues. However,
25% and 50% stop cues did not significantly differ (p=.81,
nˆ2G = .000). At test, whilst the main effect of cue type was
not significant (p = .19, nˆ2G = .000), a two way interaction
between cue type and group was observed in measures of
reaction time (p<.05, nˆ2G = .001). Follow up comparisons
found the interaction to be limited to the 75% vs. 25% stop
cue (p<.05, nˆ2G = .001) and 75% vs. 50% stop cue (p<.02,
nˆ2G = .001) comparisons. This suggests that the manipulation
selectively influenced the 75% stop cues and not the 25% stop
cues. The interaction reflects greater learning in the multiple-
signal group, where the overall difference between 25% (M
= 514, SD = 28) and 75% (M = 526, SD = 30) stop cues was
12ms (p<.02, nˆ2G = .003), in comparison to the single-signal
group where the difference was just 1ms (75%: M = 594, SD
= 33; 25%: M = 595, SD = 32, p = .73, nˆ2G = .000). Similarly,
a significant difference was observed between 75% and 50%
stop cues (M = 516, SD = 26) in the multiple-signal group
(p<.01, nˆ2G = .002), but not in the single-signal group (M =
596, SD = 28, p = .53, nˆ2G = .000). No significant differences
were observed between 25% and 50% stop cues (all p>.65).
Thus, we now have clear evidence that the multiple-signal
group shows a stronger stopping effect on the RT measure
than the single-signal group. We should point out that the
single-signal group were markedly slower in both training
(p<.04, nˆ2G = .051) and test (p<.02, nˆ
2
G = .085) (M = 589,
SD = 123; M = 595, SD = 140, respectively) in comparison
to the multiple-signal group (M = 531, SD = 90; M = 519,
SD = 104, respectively). We have no ready explanation for
this effect, given that it did not occur in Experiment 1. Al-
though this slowing could be interpreted as problematic for
between-group comparisons, as slowing for the single-signal
group may have obscured cue-specific slowing, we note that
reaction times of this group are comparable to Experiment 1
(where a main effect of cue type was observed).
In the p(respond|signal) measure of performance, a sig-
nificant cue type by block interaction was observed during
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Table 4
Summary of Experiment 2
DFn DFd SSn SSd F p p<.05 nˆ2G
Training
Go Reaction Time
cue type 2 116 8262.61 145565.40 3.29 .044 * .000
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 58 6799.12 96757.20 4.08 .048 * .000
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 5529.22 59973.96 5.35 .024 * .000
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 65.58 61616.98 0.06 .805 .000
multiple/single 1 58 1477576.00 20187171.00 4.25 .044 * .051
p(respond)
cue type 2 116 0.07 2.23 1.92 .159 .002
block 9 522 0.19 14.40 0.78 .623 .006
cue type:block 18 1044 0.47 12.78 2.13 .007 * .014
first half 2 116 0.03 1.58 0.96 .363 .001
second half 2 116 0.24 1.96 7.02 .003 * .016
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 58 0.20 1.25 9.25 .004 * .014
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 0.00 0.52 0.29 .589 .001
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 0.16 1.18 7.64 .008 * .016
Test
Go Reaction Time
cue type 2 116 1890.22 65004.26 1.69 .191 .000
multiple/single 1 58 519677.60 5316395.87 5.67 .021 * .085
cue type:multiple/single 2 116 3532.42 65004.26 3.15 .048 * .001
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 58 2872.02 39775.74 4.19 .045 * .001
single 1 29 70.90 17576.00 0.12 .734 .000
multiple 1 29 4539.00 22200.00 5.93 .021 * .003
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 2405.99 25064.57 5.57 .022 * .001
single 1 29 153.00 11198.00 0.40 .533 .000
multiple 1 29 3247.00 13866.00 6.79 .014 * .002
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 20.61 32666.09 0.04 .849 .000
single 1 29 15.70 17030.00 0.03 .871 .000
multiple 1 29 107.93 15637.00 0.20 .658 .000
p(respond)
cue type 2 116 0.02 1.44 0.70 .496 .004
block 1 58 0.05 0.84 3.72 .059 ^ .011
cue type:block 2 116 0.08 1.25 3.58 .031 * .016
first block 2 116 0.06 1.30 2.49 .088 ^ .025
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 58 0.04 0.78 3.33 .073 ^ .021
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 0.00 0.56 0.02 .885 .001
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 0.04 0.61 3.67 .060 ^ .032
second block 2 116 0.04 1.40 1.60 .206 .015
both training (p<.01, nˆ2G = .014) and test (p<.03, nˆ
2
G = .016).
Follow up comparisons revealed that differences in cue type
were contingent on the amount of training; whilst the first
half of training displayed no significant effect of cue type
(p=.36, nˆ2G = .001) the second half of training did (p<.01,
nˆ2G = .016). 75% stop cues (M = 0.30, SD = 0.06) resulted in
significantly fewer errors than 25% stop cues (M = 0.33, SD
= 0.09) (p<.01, nˆ2G = .014), but did not differ from 50% cues
(M = 0.30, SD = 0.01) (p=.59, nˆ2G = .001). Additionally, 25%
and 50% stop cues differed significantly (p<.01, nˆ2G = .016).
Conversely, at test, the effect of cue type was marginally sig-
nificant during the first block (p = .09, nˆ2G = .025), but had
extinguished by the second block (p = .20, nˆ2G = .015). Follow
up comparisons, performed on the first block of test, revealed
that 25% stop cues (M = 0.34, SD = 0.14) marginally differed
from both 75% (M = 0.30, SD = 0.13) (p<.07, nˆ2G = .021)
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and 50% cues (M = 0.30, SD = 0.04) (p<.06, nˆ2G = .032).
However, 75% and 50% stop cues did not differ (p = .89,
nˆ2G = .001).
These results help us interpret the findings of Experiment
1: We can now be sure that the multiple-signal training regime
results in more robust slowing to 75% stop cues, in measures
of reaction time, than the single-signal variant. Similarly, in
measures of p(respond|signal) a main effect of trial type was
observed, albeit limited to the second half of training, and a
marginal effect on test.
General Discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that manipulating the pair-
ings between cues and stop signals, in a manner that re-
duces their contingent relationship, results in more robust
cue-specific stop effects on reaction times, but does not affect
p(respond|signal) (i.e. measures of p(respond|signal) do not
interact with group). Across both experiments the multiple-
signal groups show effects on both measures during test, but
the single-signal groups do not always do so. The single-
signal groups produce reliable effects on p(respond|signal)
in both experiments, in the sense that there is evidence of an
effect of cue type and no significant interaction with Group,
but the evidence for any effect on RT is mixed. There is a reli-
able effect in Experiment 1, but none in Experiment 2, and the
effect in the multiple-signal group in this last experiment is
significantly different to that in the single-signal group. Given
the results of Experiment 1, this is perhaps the sort of pattern
that should be expected for this group on the RT measure, and
suggests a relatively weak effect of the indirect associative
pathway on RTs.
Associative learning of stop signals
We have proposed that the condition employing a single
stop signal emphasizes an indirect link from cue to stopping
via the signal representation, whereas the condition employ-
ing multiple stop signals shifts the emphasis to a direct asso-
ciation from cue to stop centre (see Best, Lawrence, Logan,
McLaren, & Verbruggen, 2015).
The careful reader might wonder why the stop signal itself,
which is a 100% valid cue for stopping, does not always (even-
tually) overshadow the cue (which at most is 75% valid in our
experiments). As a corollary, surely the signal will become
the stimulus most strongly associated with stopping and we
should be using this as a cue in some test phase where we
change the signals used to denote stopping? However, there
is a theoretical reason to doubt this logic; the signal’s timing
in relation to stopping is not ideal for associative learning
(the interval between signal and response is too short, See
Mackintosh 1974, p. 57), whereas that of the cue is (and quite
deliberately so). It may be that this allows the cue equal status
with the signal in forming a serial compound that becomes as-
sociated with stopping, and that this then leads to our current
pattern of results. On the other hand, it may be that the sig-
nal is entirely ineffective in associating to the stop outcome,
and that the only associations in play are those involving the
cue. Supporting this view, research assessing how the rela-
tive speed of the stop process (as indexed by SSRT) changes
with practice is mixed and does not always yield any signifi-
cant improvement (J. R. Cohen & Poldrack, 2008; Logan &
Burkell, 1986). Thus, suggesting that response inhibition may
not benefit from acquired associations between stop signals
and stopping. If the latter is the case, then we must appeal to
the competitive version of overshadowing alluded to earlier,
but if the former is true, then the generalization decrement
version of the overshadowing account is also viable. Future
research that explicitly compares the effectiveness of the cue
and the stop signal in producing associatively-mediated slow-
ing of go responses after stop training would help us to decide
between these alternatives.
We do not, at present, have the direct evidence for priming
of the stop signal representation that would substantiate our
analysis of the single signal group’s performance as being due
to the indirect pathway that we have identified. Our evidence
is indirect, and inferred from the fact that the effect on RTs
in the single signal groups is rather weak compared to that
on p(respond|signal) (see also Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014,
for a similar pattern of results). One way in which we could
attempt to rectify this in the future would be to train cues
using a single signal, and then instruct our participants that
the stop signal was no longer effective. If the indirect pathway
was in play, and was sufficiently strong to generate an effect
on RTs, then this instruction should immediately abolish any
such effect. Our data suggest that these provisos will be quite
difficult to meet, however, and we would first need to find a
method of strengthening this indirect influence to the point
where it would affect RTs reliably before making any such
attempt. As matters stand, in our experiments there would
have been little effect on RTs to influence using this manipu-
lation. The corollary, however, that the training based on use
of multiple stop signals should be unaffected by this type of in-
structional manipulation is easily done and something that we
intend to look at in the future. Additionally, we could utilize
neuroimaging techniques with fine temporal resolution (such
as EEG) to establish whether training influences perceptual
or response related processes.
The role for signal detection that we have identified pro-
vides us with an alternative to the view that the rIFG is ex-
clusively responsible for automatic ‘inhibition’. Lenartowicz
and colleagues (2011) found increased activation on no-signal
trials for stimuli that had previously been associated with stop-
ping. They argued that this reflected automatic activation of
the stop response. However, as we have demonstrated that sig-
nal detection can also become learned and subregions of rIFG
have been implicated in stimulus detection processes (Dodds,
Morein-Zamir, & Robbins, 2011; Hampshire, Chamberlain,
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Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010), it is possible that increased
rIFG activation on no-signal trials represents priming of the
stop signal (even though it is not actually presented).
A final theoretical issue is whether we are justified in clas-
sifying our results for the 75% cues as denoting associatively
mediated inhibition. Another way of interpreting our results
would be to say that the 25% cue becomes an excitatory or
"go" stimulus, promoting more rapid responding and lead-
ing to more errors on stop trials. To explore this idea, we
can use the 50% cues as a baseline because these cues are
neither associated with going nor with stopping. Thus, the
differences between 25% and 50% cue types in Experiments
1 and 2 indicates that the 25% cue becomes an excitatory or
"go" stimulus. Importantly, the differences between the 50%
baseline and the 75% cue also makes the case for the 75%
cue having an inhibitory influence on responding. Thus, we
propose that both excitatory and inhibitory effects occur (for a
more elaborate discussion of this issue, see Best et al., 2015).
Implications for stop training programmes
The implications of this research for inhibition training
are clear; if transfer effects are due to associative learning,
then the introduction of multiple stop signals should result
in greater stimulus-stop learning and potentially enhance the
effectiveness of this type of training. Certainly our evidence
suggests that the cue-specific effect is more robust in the
multiple-signal group, and we can see no reason why this
would not be expected to apply in inhibition training with
stimuli such as foods (e.g. Lawrence, Verbruggen, Morrison,
Adams, & Chambers, 2015; Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011)
or alcohol (e.g. Jones & Field, 2013) that use a stop-signal
paradigm similar to ours. It remains to be seen whether this
approach is to be preferred to the use of a Go/NoGo paradigm
for training purposes. The latter has the advantage that the
cues used to signal a NoGo trial are 100% reliable as they
do not suffer from the failure rate inherent in the tracking
procedure used in stop-signal tasks. Whilst the feature used
to signal a NoGo trial will suffer from a poor temporal rela-
tionship to stopping in terms of generating any associative
learning, this can be solved by presenting the target associa-
tive cue before the signal in this paradigm as in Best et al.
(2015) or Veling et al. (2011). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis
suggests that the Go/NoGo paradigm results in a greater re-
duction of alcohol or food consumption than the stop-signal
paradigm (Jones et al., 2015), yet none of these tasks used
multiple stop signals. There is, however, at least one reason
to think that the stop-signal paradigm will produce more po-
tent associative effects. In inhibition training with animals,
one of two standard procedures is often used. A conditioned
and unconditioned stimulus can be explicitly unpaired, thus
A+ B- will give B some inhibitory properties, or a condi-
tioned inhibition procedure can be used of the form A+ AB-.
This latter has been shown to result in stronger inhibitory
responding to B (see McLaren & Verbruggen, 2015). One
theoretical analysis of this result is simply to say that having
A predict the outcome unless it is paired with B generates
a larger prediction error, and hence stronger learning, than a
design that effectively relies on the context to do this (as in
A+ B-). Clearly the A+ AB- version is more like the stop-
signal procedure and thus, by analogy, may be expected to
produce stronger associatively-mediated stopping. It may be
that a feature negative design (Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1969),
combining the best aspects of both Go/NoGo and stop-signal
methodologies will eventually prove the most effective (and
we have some preliminary data that suggests this might be
the case). This hybrid approach would effectively use a fixed
SSD of zero, such that the signal/feature would appear at the
same time as what would otherwise be the Go stimulus, once
again producing a large prediction error to drive learning.
Conclusion
The present study sought to demonstrate that both signal
detection and automatic response suppression are implicated
in cue specific stop-signal tasks. The results suggest that ar-
ranging cues and stop-signals in a manner that reduces the
contingency between them results in more robust slowing of
reaction times on go trials preceded by a stop cue. We sug-
gest that this enhancement arises because this configuration
encourages the formation of direct stimulus-stop associations,
rather than the formation of stimulus-signal associations that
would primarily prime the detection of the stop signal. This
finding has particularly interesting implications for applied
settings. Firstly, it suggests that, if transfer effects (such as
reduced food consumption) are the result of an acquired as-
sociation with a stop response, multiple stop-signals should
be employed to maximize stimulus-stop learning. Secondly,
it suggests that stop-signal detection could also be enhanced
through training if a single stop signal is employed. This may
be of particular use in training subjects to more readily notice
cues that prepare them to inhibit a response; e.g. a driver
looking out for a red traffic light. We hope to continue our in-
vestigation of different learning/training designs so as to shed
further light on these possibilities and help develop optimal
techniques for inhibition training.
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